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Preserving the Rule of Law in Public Law Cases: 




In Keatings v Advocate General for Scotland and the Lord Advocate,1 the pursuer, a 
campaigner for Scottish independence, sought two declarators from the Outer House to 
confirm that the Scottish Parliament had the power to legislate for a Scottish independence 
referendum without the consent of the UK Government.2  Although it concerned a matter of 
public rather than private law, the case was nevertheless brought as an ordinary action of 
declarator rather than as a petition for judicial review. 
 
The pursuer made a series of eclectic constitutional arguments in support of his claim that it 
was within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament to legislate for an 
independence referendum.3 Only the first defender offered a response to these substantive 
claims.4 Between them, the first and second defenders argued that the case should be 
dismissed on a variety of preliminary grounds, namely that the proceedings were academic 
and hypothetical, that the pursuer lacked title, interest and standing.5 
 
Upon hearing the arguments, the Lord Ordinary, Lady Carmichael, dismissed the pursuer’s 
action on the grounds that it was “hypothetical, academic, and premature”, and because the 
pursuer “lack[ed] standing to bring it”.6 In deciding the case on these preliminary grounds, 
she refrained from expressing a view on the legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament. 
 
The purpose of this article is to examine key aspects of the Lord Ordinary’s reasoning in order 
to better understand how the decision was reached, as well as the implications it may have 
for public law in Scotland. It will be shown that the decision, in seeking to clarify the decision 
of the Inner House in Wightman,7 may have set a precedent for a new public law action of 
declarator.  Such an action is distinct from judicial review, but both nevertheless fall within 
the overarching jurisdiction of the court to preserve the rule of law in public law cases. 
 
B. PRESERVING THE RULE OF LAW IN PUBLIC LAW CASES 
 
(1) The nature of the jurisdiction 
 
Questions were raised over whether the action of declarator, because of its public law 
content, was in reality a petition for judicial review which invoked the supervisory jurisdiction 
 
1 [2021] CSOH 16. 
2 Ibid para 1. 
3 Ibid paras 58-76. 
4 Ibid paras 77-89 
5 Ibid paras 14-31 (first defender); paras 32-39 (second defender). 
6 Ibid para 139. 
7 Wightman v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2018] CSIH 62 (hereafter “Wightman IH”). 
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of the court.8 The Lord Ordinary however disagreed with the argument that the application 
in substance invoked the court’s supervisory jurisdiction. Reaffirming the scope of judicial 
review as defined in West,9 the Lord Ordinary observed the following:  
 
There is here no allegation that the Scottish Parliament has exceeded its powers. No 
order is sought from the court to reduce any act, or to order performance in relation 
to an omission. The pursuer seeks advice from the courts as to what the powers of the 
Scottish Parliament are. While the questions focused in the declarators raise issues of 
vires, these proceedings are not applications to the supervisory jurisdiction.10 
 
Seeking a declarator on a public law matter, therefore, did not make it any less an action of 
declarator, and the case could proceed on that basis. 
 
Furthermore, even if the application had invoked the court’s supervisory jurisdiction as 
claimed, the Lord Ordinary was nevertheless of the view that this fact alone did not make the 
application incompetent, noting that she “should have been reluctant to dispose of 
proceedings raising public law issues simply on the basis that they had been raised using the 
wrong procedure”.11 This was because the Lord Ordinary has discretion under the Rules of 
the Court of Session (“RCS”) 58.15 to enable an ordinary action to proceed as a petition for 
judicial review where the standing requirements of section 27B of the Court of Session Act 
1988 are satisfied.12 As she noted: 
 
There is no conflict between the necessity to identify whether the jurisdiction invoked 
is the supervisory jurisdiction or not, and to follow the procedural requirements 
associated with the jurisdiction in question, and the imperative to avoid situations in 
which procedural niceties could stand in the way of the enforcement by the courts of 
the rule of law.13 
 
(2) Wightman and declarators 
 
The pursuer seeking declarators drew immediate parallels with the relatively recent decision 
of the Inner House in Wightman. The Lord Ordinary accordingly had to decide what relevance 
the case had to the proceedings before her. 
 
In Wightman, a group of politicians brought a judicial review action seeking a declarator from 
the court on the revocability of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”). In order 
to get such a declarator, a referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) was 
first required. The declarator was made by the Inner House following the referral to the CJEU 
stating that, as a matter of EU Law, the UK could unilaterally revoke its notification of 
withdrawal under Article 50 of the TEU. 
 
8 Keatings para 39. 
9 West v Secretary of State for Scotland 1992 SC 385. 
10 Keatings para 95. 
11 Ibid para 97. 
12 Ibid paras 99-101. 
13 Ibid para 99]. 
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In deciding the case, the Inner House unanimously held that the subject matter of the 
declarator, the revocation of Article 50, was not an academic question,14 and that one of the 
petitioners, a Member of Parliament (“MP”), had an interest in the matter.15 This was 
attributable to the act that, by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, there 
was an impending vote on the withdrawal agreement, and MPs needed to know what their 
options were before casting their vote. 
 
The Inner House reached this conclusion having considered the requirements of declarators 
under Scots law, of which the Lord President (Lord Carloway) provides a brief but informative 
account.16 Anyone, he said, can apply to the Court in order to determine what the law is by 
virtue of the principle of access to justice, with declarators being the “traditional method” of 
securing an answer to such a legal question.17 The right to a legal ruling is not unlimited, 
however, and has been qualified by case law over many years.18 A key limitation identified by 
all three judges, as per Macnaughton v Mcnaughton’s Trs,19 is that the court should not be 
asked to decide hypothetical or academic questions.20 The Lord President elaborated on the 
meaning of such questions as follows: 
 
[T]hose that will have no practical effect. In a case where there are no petitory 
conclusions, the declarator must have a purpose. There has to be some dispute about 
the matter sought to be declared. The declarator must be designed to achieve some 
practical result.21 
 
Furthermore, this limitation on declarators overlapped with questions of title and interest, a 
legal relationship which gives rise to a right that is being denied,22 which he distilled into the 
issue of justiciability: “i.e. the pursuer or petitioner has a right to have the question of law 
decided”.23 
 
On this point, the Lord President stressed the need to distinguish public law cases from private 
law ones. Indeed, the main authorities on declarators and their limitations had come from 
private law cases far removed from the facts before the court.24 In AXA General Insurance and 
others v The Lord Advocate, Lord Reed stated that the essential function of the court was “the 
 
14 Wightman IH para 27 (Lord President); paras 36-37 (Lord Menzies); paras 58-60 (Lord Drummond Young). 
15 Ibid para 27 (Lord President); para 39 (Lord Menzies); paras 58-60 (Lord Drummond Young). 
16 Ibid paras 21-25.  This account was quoted and relied upon by the Lord Ordinary in Keatings para 121. 
17 Ibid para 21. 
18 Ibid para 22. 
19 Macnaughton v Macnaughton’s Trs 1953 SC 387, 382. 
20 Wightman IH paras 22-25 (Lord President); paras 35-36 (Lord Menzies); paras 55-60 (Lord Drummond 
Young). 
21 Ibid para 22. 
22 Ibid para 23. 
23 Ibid para 22. 
24 Ibid para 25 (Lord President); paras 35-36 (Lord Menzies). 
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preservation of the rule of law, which extends beyond the protection of individuals’ legal 
rights”.25 Applying AXA, the Lord President therefore noted the following: 
 
The merits, in terms of court time and parties’ expense, of a restrictive approach which 
limits access to the courts may be clear, but they are inconsistent with the modern 
view on the functions of a court in the public law field set out by Lord Reed in AXA … 
Although referring specifically to judicial review, and distinguishing litigation under 
the heading from actions to enforce private rights, Lord Reed … emphasised the need 
for an interests, rather than a rights, based approach in the area of public law.26     
 
In so doing, the Lord President appeared to be suggesting that the test of sufficient interest, 
as outlined in AXA, should apply to declarators. As Wightman involved a petition for judicial 
review, this test would be required anyway as per section 27B of the Court of Session Act 
1988. However, there was some doubt expressed in Wightman over whether the case 
invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the court at all.  
 
(3) A new public law action of declarator 
 
Despite the unanimous decision in Wightman, tension nevertheless exists between the obiter 
views of the Lord President (with whom Lord Menzies agreed) and Lord Drummond Young on 
the nature of the proceedings before them. 
 
The Lord President expressed doubt over whether the case fell within the scope of the court’s 
supervisory jurisdiction.27 Indeed, the same doubts had been expressed by the Outer House.28  
The Lord President did not see this as a barrier to relief, however, stating the following: 
 
[T]he court’s jurisdiction in public law matters is not confined to the review of 
decisions or failures to act. It may be that the case ought to have proceeded simply by 
way of an action of declarator rather than a petition for judicial review. However, no 
procedural point in that regard is taken.29 
 
By contrast, Lord Drummond Young saw the matter as falling within the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the court.30 In his view, the scope of this jurisdiction must be determined by 
reference to its fundamental purpose, namely “to ensure that all government … and all 
actions by public authorities are carried out in accordance with the law”, a purpose which is 
“fundamental to the rule of law”.31 Therefore, whilst acknowledging that the proceedings 
 
25 AXA General Insurance and others v The Lord Advocate and others [2011] UKSC 46, para 169.  Cited in 
Wightman IH para 24. 
26 Wightman IH para 24. 
27 Wightman IH para 26. 
28 Wightman v Secretary of State [2018[ CSOH 61 para 37.  See also R B Taylor and A L M Wilson, “Brexit, the 
revocation of Article 50, and the path not taken: Wightman and Others for Judicial Review against the 
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union” (2018) 22 Edinburgh Law Review 417.  
29 Wightman IH para 26. 
30 Ibid para 66. 
31 Ibid para 67. 
This article has been accepted for publication in the Edinburgh Law Review and is forthcoming 
in issue (2021) 25:2, pp.231-237. For the Edinburgh Law Review, see 
https://www.euppublishing.com/loi/ELR.  
 
before the court were an “unusual example of the supervisory jurisdiction”, he was 
nevertheless of the view that it fell “squarely within the fundamental purpose of the 
supervisory jurisdiction”.32   
 
The difference between the two judges’ positions was therefore as follows: whereas the Lord 
President was of the view that an application seeking clarity on a point of public law could be 
brought as a standalone action of declarator, Lord Drummond Young felt that it fell within the 
scope of the supervisory jurisdiction of the court as judicial review. 
 
In Keatings, the Lord Ordinary did not explicitly comment on which view she found to be more 
persuasive, but instead dismissed the suggestion that there was any contradiction between 
the two at all. She focused on what the dicta had in common, stating that “[t]he jurisdiction 
exercised in Wightman is properly characterised as one which is necessary to preserve the 
rule of law in the sphere of public law”.33 There is, she said, “no conflict between the views 
expressed by the Lord President and those expressed by Lord Drummond Young in that 
respect”.34 
 
In so doing, it is submitted that the Lord Ordinary has succeeded in potentially clarifying the 
law post-Wightman by implicitly identifying two distinct public law actions under the 
overarching jurisdiction of the court to preserve the rule of law: (1) the well-established 
supervisory jurisdiction of the court (judicial review); and (2) a new standalone public law 
action of declarator. As such, the Lord Ordinary seems to have given force to the Lord 
President’s obiter comments in Wightman on the availability of an action of declarator in 
addition to judicial review on public law matters.    
 
Evidence of this can be seen clearly from the conclusions the Lord Ordinary drew from the 
reasoning in Wightman, which she stated as follows: 
 
(1) It is an aspect of the right of access to justice that a person may apply to the court to 
determine what the law is in a given situation. 
(2) The court will not entertain hypothetical, premature or academic questions. 
(3) The circumstances that a public authority may assert that it has no intention to take a 
particular course will not be determinative of whether a question is hypothetical, 
premature or academic. 
(4) In determining what is hypothetical, premature or academic in the context of public 
law cases it is essential that the court consider the matter in the light of its function 
to preserve the rule of law, which extends beyond the protection of individual’s rights. 
(5) In determining whether an individual has standing in a public law case of this sort, the 
court should follow the approach desiderated in AXA and Walton,35 again with a view 
to fulfilling its function in preserving the rule of law.36 
 
32 Ibid para 68. 
33 Keatings para 94. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44 (citation added). 
36 Keatings para 124.   
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These rules govern the granting of a declarator in public law underpinned by the need to 
preserve the rule of law. Because Wightman involved a petition for judicial review, and a 
declarator is recognised as a remedy for judicial review under RCS 58.13(3)(b), the rules could 
apply to judicial review cases where a declarator is sought.  
 
Crucially, however, the Lord Ordinary’s application of the rules to Keatings, a standalone 
action of declarator, demonstrates that they are not dependent on the supervisory 
jurisdiction being engaged, and can thus be seen to constitute a new public law action of 
declarator distinct from judicial review. This is further evidenced by the Lord Ordinary’s 
emphasis on the equal applicability of judicial review’s sufficient interest test, where unlawful 
acts are alleged, “to applications for declarators as to the existing state of the law”,37 such as 
in Keatings.   
 
(4) Dismissing the action 
 
Applying Wightman to the facts in Keatings, the Lord Ordinary concluded that the subject 
matter of the requested declarators was hypothetical, academic and premature.38 
 
The Lord Ordinary rejected the arguments from the defenders that provisions within the 
Scotland Act 1998, in particular those that enabled Bills which raise questions of competence 
to be decided by the Supreme Court under sections 33 and 40, excluded the jurisdiction of 
the court to make declarators about the state of the law.39 Despite this, she was nevertheless 
of the view that: 
 
[I]t will generally … be premature and pointless for the courts to adjudicate as to the 
lawfulness of a proposed act of Parliament at any point before it is passed, because it 
is open to change by way of amendment at the hands of the Parliament itself until it 
has been passed. Advice in the abstract, or about a draft, or even a bill as presented, 
would not necessarily avail Members of the Scottish Parliament who wanted to know 
whether their vote would result in the passing of legislation that was ultra vires.40 
 
Once any legislation was passed, options for legal redress either before Royal Assent under 
the Scotland 1998 of afterwards via judicial review would be available.41 
 
Furthermore, the Lord Ordinary concluded that the pursuer lacked standing to bring the 
action. In Wightman, only one of the petitioners, the MP concerned, had sufficient interest 
due to the impending vote on ratification of the withdrawal agreement under the 2018 Act. 
The pursuer, and any other campaigner or voter, was not in an equivalent position to that of 
the MP in Wightman, and thus lacked sufficient interest.42 
 
37 Keatings para 116. 
38 Ibid para 139. 
39 Ibid paras 102-112. 
40 Ibid para 131.  See also para 103. 
41 Ibid para 130.  
42 Ibid paras 133-137. 
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Following the Lord Ordinary’s reasoning in Keatings, assuming it is not overturned on appeal, 
it seems likely that an answer to whether or not it is within the legislative competence of the 
Scottish Parliament to unilaterally legislate for an independence referendum will only be 
answered if and when a Bill is passed. Despite this, the decision of the Lord Ordinary, by 
building on the decisions of AXA and Wightman, is nevertheless significant in expanding the 
jurisdiction of the Court to preserve the rule of law in public law cases to the point where a 
new and distinct public law action of declarator appears to have emerged alongside judicial 
review. This new action, by no longer restricting public law litigation to unlawful acts, is likely 
to have a significant impact on the development of Scottish public law and the role of the 
courts in the years to come.  
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